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At the beginning of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, 
we estimated the potential surge in demand for hospital-
based services in 4 Health Service Districts of Queensland, 
Australia, using the FluSurge model. Modifi cations to the 
model were made on the basis of emergent evidence 
and results provided to local hospitals to inform resource 
planning for the forthcoming pandemic. To evaluate the fi t of 
the model, a comparison between the model’s predictions 
and actual hospitalizations was made. In early 2010, a 
Web-based survey was undertaken to evaluate the model’s 
usefulness. Predictions based on modifi ed assumptions 
arising from the new pandemic gained better fi t than results 
from the default model. The survey identifi ed that the 
modeling support was helpful and useful to service planning 
for local hospitals. Our research illustrates an integrated 
framework involving post hoc comparison and evaluation 
for implementing epidemiologic modeling in response to a 
public health emergency.
Infl uenza pandemics can result in substantial excess illness and death (1,2). In the past century, 3 infl uenza 
pandemics have occurred, commonly referred to as the 1918 
Spanish fl u, the 1957 Asian fl u, and the 1968 Hong Kong 
fl u. It is estimated that 40–50 million persons died during 
the 1918 pandemic, which is considered to be one of the 
most severe disease events in history (1,2). The following 2 
relatively mild pandemics caused approximately 2 million 
(1957) and 1 million (1968) deaths, respectively (1,2).
It is widely foreseen that excess illness and deaths in 
a future pandemic may place serious demands on and even 
exhaust the available hospital resources in a community. 
For example, modeling studies consistently predict that 
current intensive care unit (ICU) services in several 
industrialized countries could be overwhelmed during a 
future event of pandemic infl uenza (3–5). The prediction 
of the expected impact of an emerging pandemic would 
enable appropriate preparation to be made without 
diversion of excess resources and thus have the potential 
to reduce pandemic- and nonpandemic-related illness and 
death.
Since April 2009, a new variant of infl uenza virus 
A (H1N1) initially discovered in Mexico and the United 
States has caused a wave of pandemic infl uenza. On May 
8, 2009, the fi rst case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infl uenza 
in Australia was confi rmed in Queensland (6). During the 
initial “Delay” and “Contain” phases of the Australian 
Health Management Plan for Pandemic Infl uenza (7), 
during April 26–June 22, 2009, a total of 593 laboratory-
confi rmed cases were notifi ed in Queensland. Among the 
patients these cases represent, 16 hospitalizations and no 
deaths were reported (8). However, the reported number 
of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths may only represent a 
small fraction of the true numbers because not all persons 
who are infected seek medical care and have a specimen 
collected. Further, not all specimens will have positive 
results and be reported (9).
To assist hospital planners in their preparation 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, at the emerging stage of 
the pandemic in 2009, regional epidemiologists made 
predictions of the potential need for general hospital 
resources and ICU services for 4 Health Service Districts 
in Queensland, Australia, by using the FluSurge model 
developed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in the United States (10,11). A follow-up survey 
was conducted in early 2010 to evaluate the application of 
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these predictions. The aims of the studies were to describe 
the modeling work, to explore the fi tness of the predictions 
to the actual hospital data, and to evaluate the application 
and usefulness of the modeling to hospital planners.
Methods
Design
This article describes results from 2 studies. The 
fi rst study compared the model’s predictions to the actual 
data for the largest district, Metro North. The modeling 
techniques used to calculate these predictions are described. 
The second study was a Web-based cross-sectional survey 
among the hospital staff who had access to and used these 
predictions in the response to the pandemic. The aim of this 
survey was to examine how the projections were applied 
and whether they were perceived as useful in planning.
Modeling was undertaken during May 29–June 29, 
2009, when cases in Australia emerged. The Web-based 
survey was conducted in May 2010.
Service Provision Area
Central Regional Services is 1 of 3 regional services 
of Queensland Health that provide public health services 
to 4 Health Service Districts, including Metro North (the 
northern side of Brisbane, population 770,000), Sunshine 
Coast-Wide Bay (SCWB, population 501,000), Central 
Queensland (CQ, population 189,000), and Central 
West (CW, population 12,000). Together these districts 
account for 38% of Queensland’s population and 32% of 
Queensland’s area. According to the remoteness structure 
defi ned by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (12), most 
of Metro North and SCWB are classifi ed as major city or 
inner regional (urban), and CQ and CW are mainly outer 
regional or remote areas.
Modeling Tool
FluSurge (11) predicts the surge in demand for 
hospital-based services during an infl uenza pandemic, 
yielding estimates of the number of hospitalizations 
(including ICU admissions) and deaths caused by a 
pandemic in comparison to the existing hospital capacity. 
Major assumptions of the FluSurge model include that 
hospital admissions for pandemic infl uenza pose an 
extra inconvenience to the current resources and that the 
admissions are normally distributed over a given time 
period of the pandemic. Prior to 2009, the model was 
used to predict the demand for hospital-based services of 
a future pandemic in the United States (3,10), England (4), 
Mexico (13), and the Netherlands (14,15). More recently, 
this tool was also used in the Australian state of Victoria for 
the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (16).
Data Sources
District and age-specifi c population data (estimated 
resident population 2007 data from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, released August 19, 2008; cat. no. 3235.0) and 
district-specifi c hospital resource data (for both public and 
private hospitals) were used as model inputs. Resource 
data for public hospitals were obtained from the Monthly 
Activity Collection produced by the Health Statistics 
Centre and verifi ed by hospital managers. Private hospital 
data were based upon licensed capacity of operational 
status by designations, obtained from the Private Health 
Unit. As Queensland data on ventilators were unavailable, 
we used the proportion (53.3%) of available ventilators 
among available ICU beds in New South Wales (Health 
New South Wales, unpub. data) to estimate the number of 
available ventilators in Queensland hospitals. To compare 
modeling predictions with actual data, weekly numbers of 
hospital admissions because of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
by care type (general bed care, ICU admission and/or 
ventilation) for each district were extracted from EpiLog, a 
Web-based application on which hospital-admitted patients 
who were suspected of having pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
were registered.
Postservice Survey
We conducted a postservice survey using a Web-based 
survey tool, SurveyMonkey (17), seeking information on 
1) users of the predictions (including position, role, and 
district); 2) use of the predictions; 3) perceived usefulness of 
the predictions; and 4) recommendations and suggestions. 
Both closed and open-ended questions were used.
Thirty-one hospital planning staff from the 4 districts 
who were involved in the pandemic response for their 
district in June 2009 were approached; 16 (52%) responded 
to the survey. Data analysis was conducted with 15 
respondents (48%) as 1 questionnaire was incomplete. 
Among the respondents, 6 (40%) were from Metro North, 
4 (27%) from SCWB, 3 (20%) from CW, and 2 (13%) 
from CQ. A large percentage of respondents (40%) held 
nursing positions. Many other respondents were pandemic 
planning directors and coordinators (13%), or infection 
control offi cers (13%). All played a role in the district 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 planning and response.
Data Analysis
Modeling efforts were summarized, and the main 
inputs and results of an example district (Metro North) 
were presented in a descriptive manner. The rationale 
and procedure of modifi cations to the default FluSurge 
assumptions were also reported. Modeling predictions and 
the actual data from the EpiLog were compared visually 
by plotting.
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Responses to survey questions were presented in count 
and percentages. Content analysis was used to examine the 
open-ended questions and examples were provided.
Ethics Approval
Ethical approval was obtained from the Royal 
Brisbane and Women’s Hospital Human Research 
Committee for the survey. Participation in the survey 
was voluntary. Anonymity, confi dentially, and privacy 
of participant responses and any personal details were 
assured. All participants completed the consent section 
before responding to the questionnaire.
Results
Modeling for Planning
In the initial modeling stage (May 20–29, 2009) 
predictions regarding the potential hospital load caused 
by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the 4 districts, were made 
by using FluSurge 2.0 (www.cdc.gov/fl u/tools/fl usurge). 
Given that data regarding the current pandemic were 
unavailable, we used assumptions derived from previous 
pandemics in the United States, as recommended by the 
authors of FluSurge (11) and other studies (4; Health New 
South Wales, unpub. data). Assumptions included a 25% 
attack rate and 12-week outbreak duration (Table).
Using the largest district, Metro North, as an example, 
we found by initial modeling that a moderate pandemic 
would result in a total of 2,840 hospital admissions (Table). 
Peak hospital admission would likely occur at week 6 and 
week 7 with 426 (range 166–571) admissions per week 
(Figure 1). During the peak week of the pandemic, 9% of 
available general beds and 83% of available ICU beds, in 
both public and private hospitals, would be occupied by 
patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Table). The model 
also predicted that the need for ventilator capacity would 
exceed the current availability by 17% (Table).
In early June, these results were then presented to those 
involved in pandemic response and/or hospital planning. 
However, it was evident through discussion that some 
major assumptions of the initial model, such as the attack 
rate, hospitalization rate, and proportions that require ICU 
or ventilation care, needed revision in line with emerging 
evidence. For example, although at that time Australia 
was still in the early stage of responding, data emerging 
from North America suggested that the new pandemic was 
much less severe than originally expected. Specifi cally, it 
appeared that the present attack rate and incidence of both 
hospitalization and related death was lower than that used 
in the model (18,19; Australian Government Department 
of Health and Ageing, unpub. data). In addition, historic 
seasonal infl uenza data for Queensland suggested that the 
duration would be longer than 12 weeks (20). However, a 
limitation of the initial model was that the FluSurge only 
provided 3 options for the attack rate (15%, 25%, and 
35%), 3 options for the duration (6, 8, and 12 weeks), and 
an unadjustable hospitalization risk (11).
A modifi ed model with more fl exible inputs was then 
developed to address these limitations. In this modifi ed 
model, the number of cases related to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was estimated by total population multiplied by 
the gross attack rate (same as the original FluSurge 
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Table. Modeling attempts for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Metro North Health Service District, Queensland, Australia, 2009* 
Variable FluSurge 2.0 Modified model 
Parameter and assumption/source 
 Population  812,941 812,941 
 Gross attack rate 25% 15% 
 Hospitalization rate Default 0.5% 
 Duration of hospitalization 12 wk 14 wk 
 Proportion of patients needing ICU care 20% 10% 
 Proportion of patients needing ventilation 15% 7.5% 
 Average length of non-ICU hospitalization  5 d 5 d 
 Average length of ICU stay 10 d 10 d 
 Average length of ventilator usage 10 d 10 d 
 Available hospital resources Private and public hospitals Public hospitals only 
Main output 
 Hospital admissions 2,840 (range 1,104–3,810) 610
 Patients needing general beds only – 549
 Patients needing ICU care – 61
 ICU patients needing ventilator care – 46
 Bed demands/availability during peak week 
   General 9% 2% 
   ICU 83% 10% 
  Ventilator 117% 13% 
*ICU, intensive care unit; –, not applicable. 
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model). The number of hospital admissions was then 
calculated by multiplying the number of cases by the gross 
hospitalization rate. The modifi ed model also assumed that 
the total number of admissions would be allocated to each 
day within the pandemic period according to a symmetric 
distribution. The number of admissions and bed demands 
by care type and time were estimated according to the 
original FluSurge model methods. The main advantage of 
the modifi ed model was that any value of attack rate (0%–
100%), hospitalization rate, and duration could be accepted. 
However, because a single hospitalization rate was used 
instead of the default range in the original FluSurge model, 
the modifi ed model could no longer generate a confi dence 
interval. Nevertheless, the modifi cations were expedient 
and addressed the planners’ concerns of unreasonable 
default assumptions.
On the basis of the modifi ed model, repeated analyses 
were conducted in June 2009. We hypothesized a 15% attack 
rate, 0.5% hospitalization rate (among infected persons), 
and 14-week duration (Table). A series of sensitivity 
analyses were also made by increasing or decreasing the 
value of major assumptions within the model. The main 
results under the base-case assumptions are presented in 
the Table. At the peak week of hospitalization, the required 
numbers of 3 types of beds were predicted to account for 
2% general, 10% ICU, and 13% ventilator of the current 
availabilities of public hospital resources (Table). The 
modifi ed assumptions and results, along with sensitivity 
analyses were endorsed by Metro North planners and used 
to inform resource planning.
Comparisons with Actual Data
We determined that, according to the number of 
hospital admissions, the 2009 outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Metro North started with week 25. During a 14-
week period (weeks 25–38), a total of 308 patients with 
confi rmed or probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infl uenza 
were hospitalized in Metro North hospitals. The majority 
(92.3%) were admitted into public hospitals. Seventy-four 
(21.1%) patients were cared for in an ICU, and 42 (13.6%) 
were treated with mechanical ventilation.
Compared with actual data above, the original 
FluSurge model (Figure 1; Table) largely overpredicted 
the effects on hospital-based services. This supported the 
appropriateness of modifying the assumptions as proposed. 
The comparison between predictions of the total and ICU 
admissions based on the modifi ed model and the actual data 
are shown in Figure 2. This fi gure shows that the predicted 
and actual hospitalizations mapped fairly closely for the 
fi rst 6 weeks of the pandemic, after which there was a rapid 
drop. Of particular interest to hospital managers was that 
the actual number of ICU admissions for each week fi tted 
reasonably well to the modeling line (Figure 2).
Follow-up Survey among Users
Twelve (80%) respondents reported they had used 
the epidemiologists’ modeling results to inform pandemic 
response in their districts. Two broad types of use were 
identifi ed: specifi c use in bed planning and general use to 
enhance awareness about the pandemic. Participants from 
larger districts (Metro North and SCWB) tended to use the 
results for preparation purposes in bed use, service demand, 
and staffi ng. The districts with smaller populations used the 
models to enhance general awareness of the pandemic.
Four (36%) of 11 respondents believed the predictions 
had made a change in the pandemic response, 6 (55%) 
stated no change was induced, and 1 (9%) was not sure. The 
changes seemed subjective and indirect, derived mainly 
from better understanding and more confi dence among 
the planners themselves, which in turn would benefi t the 
health system and society. One respondent described how 
the modeling provided a robust indication of the impact on 
hospital resources that facilitated changes of work patterns, 
transfer of patients, and the delay of elective survey. The 
curve helped identify outbreak progress and when the peak 
had passed. However, the perceived changes only occurred 
in the 2 districts with larger populations, most notably 
Metro North where most of the epidemiologic support was 
provided. Respondents from the 2 smaller districts did not 
report any change attributed to the modeling. 
All respondents (n = 11) agreed that the predictions 
were useful to some extent. Four persons considered the 
predictions to be “quite useful or very useful”; all were 
from Metro North or SCWB. Participants from the smaller 
districts (CQ and CW) only considered the modeling to be 
little to moderately useful. 
Similarly, all respondents (n = 14) stated that the 
communication (e.g., meetings, telephone calls, and emails) 
between epidemiologists and districts during the pandemic 
was important to some extent. Nine rated communication 
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Figure 1. Predicted hospital admissions during an infl uenza 
pandemic with 25% attack rate and 12-week duration in Metro 
North Health Service District, Queensland, Australia, estimated by 
using FluSurge 2.0. 
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as “quite important” or “very important”; 8 were from the 
2 larger districts. All respondents (n = 14) agreed that it 
is helpful to make some predictions before or at the early 
stage of a pandemic. Most (11/14) believed it was “quite 
helpful” or “very helpful”; 9 of these respondents were 
from the larger districts. 
Most (13/14) stated that they would recommend 
predictive modeling be used in future pandemic responses. 
The modeling assisted hospital planning and enhanced 
confi dence. One respondent identifi ed the role of having 
trust in the predictions by understanding the assumptions 
used by the epidemiologists, and that this trust empowered 
more sophisticated planning and action to manage the 
excess demand.
Discussion
We have illustrated a practical framework for 
epidemiologic modeling in response to a public health 
emergency, such as a pandemic of infectious disease. The 
framework could be described as 4 consecutive steps: 
need identifi cation, modeling and presentation, fi eld 
use of predictions, and evaluation. This project directly 
translated existing and emerging knowledge into practice 
and combined 2 studies to “tell a whole story.”
Although models such as FluSurge are readily available 
and simple to use, our experience suggests modifi cation is 
required. When we used modifi ed assumptions on the basis 
of emergent information on the novel pandemic infl uenza, 
more reasonable predictions resulted than when we used 
default assumptions derived from previous pandemics. 
Although many modeling studies have been conducted 
using similar tools (3,4,10,13–15), none of them have been 
subsequently tested by using actual data and evaluated in 
terms of the usefulness in practice. Similar to our initial 
modeling using the default FluSurge model, most of these 
studies substantially overestimated the impact of the new 
pandemic compared to the actual 2009 situation. Lack of 
communication with users and relying only on historical 
data may contribute to this problem. The interest of users 
and their involvement appears to be essential for successful 
epidemiologic modeling.
The post hoc survey is unique to this study. Results 
indicate that the modeling and associated support by 
epidemiologists were well received overall. However, the 
perceived usefulness of the modeling was more notable for 
the larger districts than for the smaller districts. We speculate 
that this occurs because there are larger uncertainties 
regarding modeling and relatively lower consequences in a 
small population. Although we did not attempt to measure 
any direct benefi ts to the communities, the survey data and 
ad hoc comments received shows that the modeling and 
consultation services provided by the epidemiologists were 
used to manage hospital services confi dently.
Although they fi tted better, the modifi ed projections 
seemed to still overestimate the impact, especially the 
total number of hospitalizations (Figure 2). The main 
reason is that our assumption of hospitalization rate in 
general population (15% attack rate × 0.5% hospitalization 
rate = 75/100,000 persons) is far higher than the actual 
rate in Metro North (308/770,000 = 40/100,000 persons) 
and the rate in Australia (23/100,000 persons) (21). The 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak turned out to be shorter 
than observed in seasonal infl uenza (20). One plausible 
explanation is that Metro North is a metropolitan area and 
disease transmission there may be more intense than in the 
whole state, which covers a considerable rural population. 
It is unknown whether the awareness of the modeling 
results might have resulted in changes in admission policy 
and subsequently affected the number of admissions. In this 
paper we only presented Metro North data as an example 
to demonstrate our modeling work. For SCWB district with 
similar number of residents to the Metro North district, 
similar results were observed (data not shown). However, 
for the other 2 small districts, the projections were far more 
serious than the actual events. This, in accordance with the 
survey data, indicates that the modeling work for small 
populations is more diffi cult and less useful.
There are some limitations to the modeling. First, we 
assumed a normal distribution of patients over a given 
period, but the epidemic curve is not symmetric (22). The 
curve usually increases quickly, almost exponentially, 
and then declines with a long tail after the peak. Second, 
estimates were made on the basis of the population in 
these Health Service Districts. The actual number of 
hospitalizations, however, was obtained from all hospitals 
within this area rather than all episodes occurring in the 
whole population. In other words, patient fl ow was not taken 
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Figure 2. Modeled numbers of total and intensive care unit (ICU) 
admissions caused by a hypothesized 14-week infl uenza outbreak 
in Metro North Health Service District, Queensland, Australia. 
This model uses assumptions of a 15% attack rate and 0.5% 
hospitalization rate compared to actual data.
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into account in the comparisons. Nevertheless, parallel 
data obtained from the Queensland Hospital Admitted 
Patient Data Collection (which records information about 
episodes of hospital care for all Queensland hospitals) 
showed that assumptions of patient fl ows were reasonable 
and consistent because the net effect was similar. Third, 
the ventilator capacity was not exactly measured but 
estimated on the basis of data from another state (17), and 
ICU staff, surge capacity of staff, and absenteeism during a 
pandemic were not taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
some major assumptions, such as expected attack rate and 
hospitalization rate, were somewhat arbitrary. Additionally, 
many factors that may affect the probability of hospital 
admission (23), such as obesity, pregnancy, and proportion 
of Indigenous population, were not included in the model. 
The above limitations would have certain negative effect 
on the accuracy of the predictions. However, we relied on 
the best information available at the time. In addition, a 
series of sensitivity analyses were attached to the base-
case estimation. We perceive that the process integrating 
communication–feedback–presentation is of high value, 
even higher than the results themselves. The evaluation 
survey revealed many planners took the opportunity 
to understand modeling processes and enhance their 
understanding of the new pandemic.
Another limitation is that only visualization was used 
to compare projected to actual data, rather than more 
sophisticated statistical tests. The low response rate (52%) 
and the small number of respondents (n = 15) may also 
bias the fi ndings from the survey because nonresponders’ 
views may differ from responders and thus reduce the 
representativeness of the sample. Although diffi cult to 
assess, the role stated by the participants appears to indicate 
that key informants from each Health Service District are 
represented in the survey. The survey is also limited in 
that several months had passed between when the models 
had fi rst been applied and when the survey was conducted. 
Consequently, the survey relied on recall and refl ection, 
both of which can be subject to bias.
Given the above limitations, the net robustness of the 
model and evaluation are less than ideal, and the predictions 
and modifi cations cannot be immediately extrapolated 
to other areas or outbreaks. Despite these limitations, we 
fi rmly believe the principles of modeling and partnerships 
shown here are valuable for epidemiologists and policy 
makers in practice and research. It is hoped that the 
framework illustrated in this study may serve as a general 
model for epidemiologists who provide epidemiologic 
services in a public health unit context.
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